Stalni predstavnik RH pri Ujedinjenim narodima, veleposlanik Neven Jurica, održao je govor na raspravi Vijeca sigurnosti UN-a na temu mirovnih operacija UN-a.
Mr. President,
Let me begin by extending our appreciation to the Under-Secretary Mr. Le Roy, Under Secretary Malcorra and Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, Mr. Hedi Annabi for their valuable contributions to our debate.
First of all, we would like to commend the French presidency of the Security Council and the UK delegation for convening this important and timely meeting regarding an issue of great importance not only for the Member States of the Council, but also for the entire membership of the UN. Although the issue of peacekeeping operations has understandably been in the focus of this august body for many years, and with noteworthy results, we find it appropriate, particularly at this moment, to engage in a thorough discussion on some of its key elements on the basis of the non-paper prepared by France and UK.
Croatia aligns itself with the statement to be delivered by the Czech delegation on behalf of the EU.
The world landscape has changed sharply in recent years: the nature of the contemporary conflict has been increasingly shifted from the inter-state to an intra-state level, and as a result we are witnessing new challenges and threats to international peace and security. In reacting to these challenges the Security Council, from the beginning of the 1990's, increasing resorted to Peacekeeping Operations [PKO] as a basic instrument at the disposal of the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Today it seems that these efforts have reached their peak with more than 112,000 personnel engaged in current PKO's, while the annual budget for these missions is three times in size of the annualized UN regular budget. It is fair to say that this enormous jump in costs of the Peacekeeping budget was not only the consequence of the rising number of PKO's, but also their considerable change in nature from simple military operations towards multidimensional integrated military-civilian projects.
In our opinion, the basic precondition for reaching a well founded decision on establishing and sending a PKO to the certain area, and equally so, on possible changes to its mandate and the final closure of a mission, is timely and current information regarding the situation on the ground, as well as, accompanying military and political analysis of the conflict. In that context, we are of the opinion that the information available to the Council through different mechanisms is adequate, although more needs to be done on the quality of information received. Similarly, we deem appropriate for the Council to include in an adequate manner and an appropriate time other states, especially troop contributing countries [TCC's] or states which offer other significant contributions to a PKO, in the process of information exchange and decision making.
Moreover, it is important to stress that, unlike some military alliances, the UN do not strive to resolve a conflict first and foremost by military means, but seeks to address the problems at their root causes, measuring, inter alia, the level of security by the level of improvement in the every day life of the affected population. Croatia fully supports the standpoint of the UN according to which the building of lasting peace and security can be solidly built only through the three interlinked and firmly grounded basic pillars: security, development and the protection of human rights.
It is evident that when addressing PKO's in their new three pillar context the civilian and police components of these operations are becoming increasingly important, and we are of the opinion that it is extremely important that states provide qualified civilian and police personnel to engage in these tasks. We reiterate our readiness to contribute to the establishment of permanent rosters of civilian experts experienced in post-conflict stabilization that can be deployed to a conflict area on short notice immediately after the establishment of a cease-fire. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that PKO's are not primarily intended for reconstruction and rebuilding of a country in which they area deployed, as other specialized organizations and institutions can carry out these activities more efficiently and less expensively.
It is becoming self evident that the capability of many traditional TCC's to contribute troops to PKO's has been significantly diminished. On the other hand, newly emerged contributors often lack the infrastructure, equipment and training necessary for the effective integration of their troops into more complex missions.
In order to share the burden imposed by PKO's, the UN should strengthen its cooperation with regional organizations, as well as improve cooperation between its and other international agencies active on the ground. Since the majority of UN PKO's take place in Africa, we believe that the cooperation between the UN and AU and ECOWAS is particularly important. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that these organizations lack exactly what PKO's need, and that is qualified personnel and resources for peacekeeping activities. Nonetheless, active cooperation and support in capacity building of regional organizations would have enormous long term benefits.
Finally, in further discussions on the challenges confronting PKO's, the Security Council needs to carefully examine the question of whether resources are being allocated properly, or does room exist for reallocating resources through downsizing some old missions or closing them altogether. The answer to this question will have significant influence on the future of UN peacekeeping.
Having said all this, it is impossible not to refer shortly to the Brahimi report and some of its main recommendations, which, although not answering all of our questions, still contain clear guidelines that, even almost ten years after their emergence, need to be taking into consideration. As a representative of a country that in a short period of time hosted five UN peacekeeping missions, and consequently has the opportunity to experience first hand the performances of each of them, I would like to draw your attention to the following recommendations:
1. the necessity to ensure clear and achievable mandate;
2. the necessity to provide, before the establishment of the mission, the resources necessary for the full execution of the mission's mandate;
3. the appropriate equipment of the forces with the capacity, if mandated, to confront violence;
4. the necessity to ensure political and resource backing from member states, as well as adequate staffing.
From our perspective, we would also add to these aforementioned recommendations the importance of involving domestic resources, whenever possible and without exacerbating existing political tensions. This can help to improve effectiveness of the operation with minimal expenses and help secure a unique perspective towards the conflict not otherwise available to outsiders. Equally so, the value of this approach is in the possibility to develop the capacities necessary for the reconstruction and establishment of national administration that will govern the country after the departure of the international community. It can also have the added benefit of having the local population better accept the PKO and its forces.
Croatia would like to stress that while the UN has clearly defined criteria for monitoring the implementation of PKO mandates, it is important that these criteria not be open to political interpretation and, once adopted, be strictly upheld. It is our belief that this last issue, especially the question of assessing benchmark's, opens the possibility for closer cooperation and additional information exchange between the Secretariat and Member States.
It is precisely the strict implementation of the aforementioned criteria which led us to different evaluations of the success [or not] of missions that were active in our own country. Our experience with the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) is a telling example where a PKO when acting in full compliance with all the aforementioned criteria can achieve excellent results.
In conclusion, let me add that Croatia now contributing to 13 UN PKO's and intends to continue to add its specific experiences and expertise to UN PKO's in the years to come.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Priopćenja
