Croatia was notified last
week that the European Commission has approved of the new strategy for
Western Balkans that offers the firmest promise of the future membership
so far, an indirect acknowledgement from Brussels that it has recognised
it cannot apply to Croatia the same models and criteria as it does to
other transition countries, and an announcement of some concrete changes.
This week, Croatian government has received a different
letter in which Commissioner Chris Patten and Greek Foreign Minister
Georgios Papandreou remind Croatia that the EU does not agree with the
signing of the agreement about the non-extradition of US soldiers to
the ICC, as well as with the conditions under which the ICC parties,
and Croatia is one of them, are allowed to do that. Croatia has yet
again found itself in a delicate position between Washington and Brussels,
as before the start of the war in Iraq. We spoke about this with Foreign
Minister Ivan Šimonović.
Q: What is the nature of Patten and Papandreou’s letter?
A: It reminds Croatia about the Council of Ministers’ decision from
September 2002 that adopted a set of guidelines on how the states should
react to the US demand that its citizens be exempt from the jurisdiction
of the ICC. It further states that the Council basically does not object
to the signing of these agreements, but only under certain conditions.
Finally, it lists all the conditions that the Council thinks these agreements
should meet in order for them to agree with the international law and
the obligations assumed through the signing of the Rome Statute.
Q: What does the EU particularly disagrees with regarding the non-extradition
agreements?
A: Two sets of problems have occurred in the model agreement, although
the US has drawn up other models too. In all the agreements that have
been signed so far the main problem is the question of scope of the
non-extradition, or who it does or does not include. The US wants this
scope to be as large as possible and include all American citizens,
as well as those non-Americans that are taking part in US-led operations.
The guidelines stated that these agreements should include only those
Americans that are taking part in certain operations, not all Americans.
The other problem concerns the avoidance of penalty, or the lack of
a clear guarantee on the part of the US that it will persecute the offenders
if they are brought back home.
Q: Has Croatia been offered such a model?
A: We have received a standardised model, but we are waiting for the
negotiations in June, when we will discuss with the US representatives
about the ways for the two countries to protect and harmonise their
interests.
Q: Does this mean that these agreements can be negotiated, that
it is not a “take it or leave it” situation?
A: Yes, those agreements can be negotiated and harmonised, but there
is not much manoeuvring room. It is highly unlikely that the US will
now make some major exceptions in view of what has been signed so far.
It is not only a question of relations with Croatia - an agreement signed
with one country has a bearing on all future agreements. Apart from
the countries that have already signed the agreement, there is a large
number of countries that the US are still negotiating with, including
countries very close to the US, like Great Britain and Italy. So far,
none of the EU members have signed the agreement. The US is still negotiating
with the EU about this.
Q: What is Croatia’s argument against this agreement?
A: There are three sets of problems that define our position as negotiators.
Firstly, Croatia is a party of the Rome Statute, which means that it
has to fulfil certain international legal obligations. The second problem
is of political nature and concerns the EU guidelines. I have spoken
recently with EU High Commissioner for Foreign Policy Chris Patten,
who literally said to me: “Your aim is the EU, not NAFTA. Keep that
in mind when negotiating.” For Croatia and other countries that are
in a similar position, it would be much easier if the EU and the US
found a common language. But the third and the most serious problem
is Croatia’s specific legal and political position as regards its obligations
towards the Hague Tribunal.
Q: Which element is the dominant one here – political or legal,
as the signing of the agreement and co-operation with the Hague tribunal
do not legally overlap?
A: The key element here is the political one. There is a Security Council’s
resolution, in the passing of which the US took part as well, which
states that a specific international crimes tribunal will be set up
for a specific country and a specific conflict. The resolution obliges
under the threat of sanctions that country to co-operate with the tribunal.
But at the same time, we have a situation where the US does not trust
the ICC for fear that it might be abused, and is asking for the non-extradition
of its citizens. Politically speaking, it is very hard to accept that
someone is being forced to co-operate with a certain tribunal under
the threat of sanctions, while at the same time some other court’s credibility
is being challenged. Croatia was asked to extradite it citizens accused
of war crimes, while at the same time not only is the US not extraditing
its citizens, but is asking of Croatia to do the same and not extradite
the US citizens to another international court. Legally speaking, these
two are totally different and mutually independent courts, but they
do share the same purpose and are therefore in a way connected. That
purpose is to ensure that if countries do not process the war criminals
themselves, there is an international mechanism that will bring justice
to the victims and punishment to criminals.
Q: Is Croatia reluctant to sign that agreement out of principle,
or because its signing would be difficult to “sell” both to foreign
and national public?
A: We have international legal obligations that we cannot step down
from. These obligations include those towards the Hague tribunal, and
those stemming from Croatia’s status as a party of the Rome Statute.
Politically speaking, I think that the Croatian government and most
of the citizens share the same view. We have not yet reached a decision,
but we are willing to negotiate with the US and have a clear negotiating
position.
Q: In what way could the discontinuation of the US military aid
affect the reforms in Croatia, as the military aid also means the financing
of the legal reform, for instance, and there are indications that Croatia
will not be granted an exemption?
A: Media have blown this way out of proportions. I think Croatia will
enter the EU and maintain good relations with the US regardless of whether
it signs the agreement or not. It is imperative that we keep good partnership
relations with the US in spite of our disagreements about certain issues.
Partners negotiate and partners respect each other’s opinions. We will
try to reach a compromise with the US representatives that will protect
the interest of both countries. Even if that does not happen, it will
not be the end of the world, and it will certainly not mean the end
of the co-operation between the US and Croatia. The military aid will
not be discontinued. We might not be able to use the $6 mil. allocated
to us this year, but that does not mean Croatian cadets will be expelled
from military academies in the US, only that we will have to pay their
scholarship for this year. Croatia is far more important to the US as
a stability factor in the region and as a constructive member of NATO,
then as an ally in war against Iraq or as a signatory of the non-extradition
agreement that is far more awkward for Croatia than for other countries.
I think it would be tragic if this agreement damaged the relations with
the US. It would be best if Croatia was exempt from the signing of the
agreement and kept the US military aid.
Q: What are the chances of Croatia getting the exemption?
A: The criteria for getting it are defined by the US national interest.
If the US advocates the acceptance of Croatia into NATO, then I think
there is reason to believe that the continuation of military aid is
of national interest to the US, as it leads to the regulation of our
military forces and the strengthening of our potential in fighting terrorism.
Nevertheless, the key argument is Croatia’s specific position as regards
its obligations towards the Hague Tribunal, the fulfilment of which
is one of US’s chief demands.
Q: On the eve of the war in Iraq, because of our government’s unclear
and contradictory statements, we barely got ourselves through by saying
that we did not have to choose, that both the US and the EU are our
partners, regardless of their disagreements. Why is Croatia now using
the EU recommendations as an argument against signing the agreement
and risking the same situation?
A: The fault lines that occurred because of Iraq and are now being
repaired by the issue of non-extradition, present a serious problem.
These lines are not good for both the US and the EU, but I believe that
they are only temporary. The US and the EU share some fundamental values
and I believe such problems can easily be overcome. As always, when
the big boys are playing, the grass gets hurt, and we want to avoid
that at all cost.
Q: The European Commission released a document on the new strategy
for the Western Balkans that brought something new for Croatia. Croatia
plans to become an EU member by 2007. You have recently said that in
that way we had limited our manoeuvring space. For what?
A: For hesitation, speculation and mistakes. Our road to EU membership
has to be as short as possible. There must be no detours if we want
to catch that train. We have missed more than a few opportunities the
past, and this is one opportunity that we simply cannot afford to miss,
for the sake of Croatia’s future and for the sake of our children. The
document you have mentioned is a positive one, because it contains two
very important elements. First, it unambiguously guarantees all SAA
countries a European future. This is important because it contributes
to the stability of the Southeast Europe. All of the dilemmas and sensitive
issues of this region, such as the borders and minorities, are relativised
by a clear European perspective. Such issues lose their importance in
the context where the borders are not so rigid and where there are efficient
mechanisms for the protection of human rights. Such a step forward for
the European Commission and, I hope, the EU members as well, will have
a directly positive effect on the stability in the Southeast Europe.
Another important element of the EC strategy is the strengthening of
the instruments that facilitate the process of approximation of Southeast
European countries to the EU standards. First of all, the European partnership,
or the joint planning of the European Commission and individual states,
taking into consideration individual differences between states, their
current level of approximation and the development of a joint programme
with control units that evaluate whether we are going as fast as we
should. The second important element is the so-called twinning. This
means that government officials from an EU member state will come to
Croatia to work with their Croatian colleagues and help them in some
practical activities. In the same way, Croatian officials will work
for the EU member states’ ministries and other state organs to gain
experience and learn from the experiences of others. On 10 June we will
talk with two directors from the Belgium’s Foreign Ministry about the
Belgian experts that will come to Croatia this summer or fall. We already
have some experience in this type of co-operation, but twinning is something
that is explicitly supported by the EU.
Q: Most of the discussions about Croatia and the EU end with the
conclusion that Croatia has not yet developed a favourable political
mentality, the so-called “European reflex.” The main proof of that is
the co-operation with the Hague. The European Commission says that it
will closely observe the Croatian government’s behaviour once the indictments
arrive, because so far the government has not shown enough determination
as regards the Croatian public. Is this Commission’s impression correct?
A: Croatia’s progress in dealing with war criminals has often been
underestimated. For a country that was a victim of aggression, it is
not easy to accept the fact that members of its own military forces
have committed war crimes that deserve punishment. Croatia has successfully
crossed that road and now almost all relevant political parties agree
that war crimes should be punished, no matter who committed them, but
that at the same time Croatia’s history, dignity and the War for Independence
should be respected. I doubt that co-operation with the Hague tribunal
will sidetrack us from our road to the EU. There have been some difficulties
on our side, but there have also been some mistakes on the side of Hague
prosecution, namely some formulations in the indictments that blatantly
disqualified the character of Croatia’s War for Independence. It is
a great shame that this has happened, as it seriously undermined the
development of a legal consciousness in Croatian people about each crime
being a crime and therefore deserving punishment. Domestic war crimes
trials are a proof of that development. Such legal proceedings serve
to prevent black spots in individual histories from spilling over the
entire War for Independence, which is something Croatia has the right
to be proud of, so that it could enter the EU and be greeted with an
applause.
Q: If Croatia’s public consciousness is so developed, why does
the government in all delicate situations explain its moves as being
the result of the “pressures from the outside”?
A: It is difficult to say whether it is always pressures from the outside.
Every government reacts to a whole range of circumstances, based on
its values, goals, on what it might win or lose... Sometimes these things
are hard to distinguish.
Q: In its visions of regional co-operation, the EU has gone as
far as the idea about creating a free trade zone in this region. Are
such predictions realistic, since some basic issues like the borders,
the return of refugees and the visa policy have not yet been settled?
A: The last document of the European Commission talks about the free
trade. Croatia has signed the free trade agreements with the countries
in the region, so for us it does not present a political or legal problem,
but there should be some clear borders. A customs union is out of the
question. The idea of regional association is economically beneficial
to Croatia because Croatia, unlike other SAA countries, will profit
from it directly. On the other hand, it would be unacceptable for us
if the regional association became a substitute for entering the EU,
if it was about creating a mini-union instead of preparing these countries
for accession. The deeper we enter the EU, the more intensive our regional
engagements can be. Regional co-operation is useful to us both politically
and in the sense of security. When talking about visa policy, Croatia
must bear in mind Schengen. We support the liberalisation of visa policy
for the purposes of facilitating the movement of people and goods in
the region, so long as it does not impede the communication between
Croatia and the EU member states. The solving of the refugees issue
is the most important political condition for entering the negotiations
with the EU. Croatia can get a favourable opinion form the European
Commission, we can even get the candidate country status, but we cannot
start negotiating before all political conditions are fulfilled, and
here the refugees issues plays the main role. The government immediately
has to define the possibilities of the refugees return, not just their
nominal rights. Persons who lost their right of tenure, but wish to
come back, must also be dealt with. There must be a way for these persons
to find at least a temporary accommodation in Croatia. We should establish
regional co-operation with both Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and
Montenegro, for the purposes of a joint stepping forward, the implementation
of a joint programme for the return of refugees, and the integration
of persons that do not wish to return to the new states. We could use
this programme to organise an international donor convention that I
think would prove very successful. I took advantage of the yesterday’s
talk with the Norwegian Foreign Minister to present that idea. The reaction
was more than favourable, as it was the first time that all three states
came forward as one and offered a joint framework for the solution of
a problem that is both of a humanitarian nature and safety-related,
as it is precisely the unsolved refugees issue that is feeding the nationalistic
extremism in all three countries.
Q: Is the Zagreb summit of the three governments going to take
place?
A: We shall see, it is still to early to talk about that. We has some
problem with harmonising the declaration. There are still some issues
we have yet to reach an agreement on. I believe we should continue in
that direction, and that Croatia’s main contribution should be a clear
definition of our government’s programme and of what we can offer to
the returnees at the moment. After that, we should define the deadlines,
provide incentives for those that will return within those deadlines,
and see whether the three states can harmonise their national programmes,
as I believe a joint appearance would mean a greater international help,
both politically and economically.